Diálogo Constitucional e Estado de Direito
Resumo
DIÁLOGO CONSTITUCIONAL E ESTADO DE DIREITO
Resumo: Neste artigo, o juiz Palmer esboça uma concepção descritiva do diálogo constitucional. Enriquece concentrando-se no que é constitucional de verdade e considerando quão alto e em que línguas os ramos do governo se engajam no diálogo. Como questão normativa, ele sugere que é importante para o Estado de Direito que os poderes do governo falem em diferentes línguas e tenham perspectivas sistemicamente diferentes. Caso contrário, não seria a lei que governa; seria a cultura "governante".
Palavras-chaves: Constituição. Poderes Públicos. Estado de Direito. Diálogo.
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE AND THE RULE OF LAW
Abstract: In this article, Judge Palmer outlines a descriptive conception of constitutional dialogue. It enriches itself by focusing on what is truly constitutional and considering how high and in what languages the branches of government engage in dialogue. As a normative issue, he suggests that it is important for the rule of law that the powers of government speak in different languages and have systemically different perspectives. Otherwise, it would not be the law that governs; would be the "ruling" culture
Keywords: Constitution. Public Powers. Rule of law. Dialogue.
Data de submissão: 17/08/2019 Data de aprovação: 17/01/2020
Referências
Juiz do Supremo Tribunal da Nova Zelândia. Este artigo é baseado em uma palestra proferida em 9 de dezembro de 2016 na Conferência de Diálogo Constitucional promovida pela Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Hong Kong. O artigo beneficiou da exposição aos documentos da conferência, alguns dos quais podem ser publicados na próxima edição do International Journal of Constitutional Law (ICON). Nada neste artigo deve ser tomado para representar os pontos de vista do Judiciário neozelandês.
Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2nd ed., 1962) p 261.
Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between the Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L J 75; Peter W Hogg, Allison A Bushell Thornton and Wade K Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited — or ‘Much Ado about Metaphors’” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1.
Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
Philip Joseph, “Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise” (2004) 15 Kings College L J 321; Aileen Kavanagh, “Judge as Partner” Paper Presented to the Constitutional Dialogue Conference (University of Hong Kong, 9 December 2016).
Veja Christine Bateup, “The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of Constitutional Dialogue” (2006) 71 Brooklyn Law Review 109.
Aileen Kavanagh, “The Lure and Limits of Dialogue” (2016) 66 University of Toronto Law Journal 83, 85.
Matthew SR Palmer, “New Zealand Constitutional Culture” (2007) 22 NZULR 565, 593–596.
Matthew SR Palmer, “What Is New Zealand’s Constitution and Who Interprets it? Constitutional Realism and the Importance of Public Office-holders” (2006) 17 Public Law Review 133; Palmer (2007) (n 7 above). I added two more statutes, and drew on these elements to offer a brief summary narrative of New Zealand’s constitution, in Matthew SR Palmer, The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2008) pp 236–238.
KN Llewellyn, “The Constitution as an Institution” (1934) 34 Columbia Law Review 1, 21.
Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) p 71.
Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By (New York: Basic Books, 2012); Laurence H Tribe, The Invisible Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
Po Jen Yap, “Statutory Rights and De Facto Constitutional Supremacy in Hong Kong” Paper Presented to the Constitutional Dialogue Conference (University of Hong Kong, 9 December 2016); Po Jen Yap, Constitutional Dialogue in Common Law Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) Chapter 5.
Palmer (2008) (n 8 acima).
New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA).
Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent’s Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA).
Law Commission, Crown Liability and Judicial Immunity: A Response to Baigent’s Case and Harvey v Derrick (NZLC R37, 1997).
Taunoa v Attorney-General (2004) 7 HRNZ 379 (HC) (on liability); Taunoa v Attorney-General (2004) 8 HRNZ 53 (HC) (on relief).
Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429.
Attorney-General v Chapman [2011] NZSC 110, [2012] 1 NZLR 462.
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA), [19]–[20].
R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 (CA).
Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1, [8], [24] (Elias CJ), [254] and [259] (McGrath J) and [267] (Anderson J). See Claudia Geiringer, “On a Road to Nowhere: Implied Declarations of Inconsistency and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act” (2009) 40 VUWLR 613, 646.
Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706.
Ngati Apa v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA).
A Lei de 2011 inclui em seu preâmbulo apenas uma das quatro referências ao estado de direito na legislação da Nova Zelândia - como tendo sido transgredida pela legislação de 2004.
Attorney-General v Leigh [2011] NZSC 106, [2012] 2 NZLR 713.
Privileges Committee “Question of privilege concerning the defamation action Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh” [2011–2014] III AJHR I.17A.
Buchanan v Jennings [2004] UKPC 36, [2005] 2 All ER 273 (PC).
Couch v Attorney-General [2010] NZSC 27, [2010] 3 NZLR 149.
Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305.
Palmer (2008) (n 8 above) Chapter 3.
Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803); 1 Cranch 137.
Cooper v Aaron 358 US 1, 19 (1958); see also Baker v Carr 369 US 186 (1962) and LD Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Yap (2016) (n 12 above).
Em 2016, meu pai, com outro estudioso constitucional Andrew Butler, publicou um livro propondo um rascunho de texto para uma constituição de lei suprema com uma cláusula de substituição legislativa. Geoffrey Palmer and Andrew Butler, A Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2016).
Paul Rishworth, “The New Zealand Bill of Rights” in Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican and Richard Mahoney (eds), The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2003) p 7. The Select Committee heard 438 submissions up and down and New Zealand over two years.
Constitutional Arrangements Committee, “Inquiry to Review New Zealand’s Existing Constitutional Arrangements: Report of the Constitutional Arrangements Committee” [2005] AJHR I.24A, [6]. I should disclose I was an expert adviser to the Committee.
Constitutional Advisory Panel, New Zealand’s Constitution: A Report on a Conversation, He Kotuinga Korero mo Te Kaupapa Ture o Aotearoa (November 2013).
Ibid., p 56.
Matthew SR Palmer, “Open the Doors and Where Are the People? Constitutional Dialogue in the Shadow of the People” in Claire Charters and Dean R Knight (eds), We, The People(s): Participation in Governance (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2011) p 50.
Ibid.
Matthew SR Palmer, “Thinking about Law and Policy: Lessons for Lawyers” Presentation to Crown Law Office and Law Commission (Wellington, December 2006), available at http://works.bepress.com/matthew_palmer/10; see Palmer (2011) (n 40 above).
See Palmer (2011) (n 40 above).
Ver Kavanagh (n 6 above).
Palmer (2007)_ (n 7 above) pp 586–589; Palmer (2008) (n 8 above) pp 285–289.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971).
AV Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: MacMillan & Co, 1885) Lecture V.
Paul Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework” [1997] PL 467 (embora sugiro que minha concepção não seja "formalista" no sentido de se relacionar apenas com o procedimento, porque se preocupa com a substância de uma lei). Da mesma forma, é mais um ideal "formalista" do que um ideal "historicista", "processo legal" ou "substantivo" em termos de uma classificação em quatro partes proposta por Richard H Fallon, “ ‘The Rule of Law’ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse” (1997) 97 Columb L Rev 1.
Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).
Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue” (1977) 93 LQR 195, 196.
See Joseph (n 4 above).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.47096/rdpc.v1i2.88
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